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ABSTRACT
~fui1e inflation may be public enemy one for many Americans, most
homeowners have reaped enormous benefits from inflation during the past
decade and a half and will likely continue to do so in the future. These
benefits take two forms. First, unanticipated inflation raises the
capitol gain earned at the time of sale above that anticipated at the
ti~e of purchase. The realized real after-tax return on the equity
investment in the house exceeds the anticipated real after-tax return to
the extent that (1) the house purchase was financed by a mortgage and/or
(2) unanticipated inflation in housing prices exceeds unanticipated
general inflation. Second, the eventual increase in anticipated inflation
lowers the user cost of capitol for owner-occupied housing owing to
declines in real after-tax interest rates. As a result, more housing is
purchased and the consumer surplus earned on housing rises. Thus
.homeowners first earned an extraordinary real monetary return, and then
.~
received enormous benefits in kind from occupying larger, higher quality
houses. The present paper provides estimates of these for homeowners in
different marginal tax brackets for different periods during the last
fifteen years and draws some public policy conclusions from the sentiments.
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INFLATION AND THE BENEFITS FROM
OWNER-OCCUPIED OOUSING
* Patric H. Hendershott and Sheng Cheng Hu
While inflation may be pUblic enemy number one for a significant portion of
Americans, many homeowners have reaped enormous benefits from infiation during
the past decade and a half and promise to continue to do so in the future. These
benefits take two forms. First, unanticipated infiation raises both the value
of the implicit rents flowing from an existing house and the capital gain earned
at the time of sale above those anticipated at the time of purchase. The
realized real after-tax return on the equity investment in the house will exceed
the anticipated real after-tax return to the extent that (1) the house purchase
was financed by a mortgage and/or (2) unanticipated inflation in housing prices
and rents exceeds unanticipated general infiation. Second, the eventual increase
in anticipated infiation lowers the user cost of capital for owner-occupied
housing owing to declines in the real after-tax cost of mortgage financing and
yields on alternative financial asset investments. As a result, more housing
is purchased and the consumer surplus earned on housing (the housing stock times
the excess of the average product over the marginal product) rises. Thus
homeowners first earn an extraordinary real monetary retur.n and then receive
enormous benefits in kind from occupying larger and higher qual!ty houses. The
present paper provides estimates of the gains from both unanticipated and
anticipated inflation for homeowners in different marginal tax brackets for
different periods during the last fifteen years.
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Mid-Year Meetings of the
American Real Estate and Urban Economic Association, Washington D. C.,
~ 23, 1979· The research is supported by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development under grant H-2987. This work was stimulated by the imaginative
analysis of Villani (1978) and comments by Sheridan Titman, Robert va.n Order,
and Kevin Villani are gratefully acknowledged.2
The first two sections of the paper pertain to the ·calculation of realized
real rates of return on homeowner equity. A framework for making the calculations
is provided in Section I, and the results are rePOrted and interpreted in
Section II. Results are given for overlapping six-year intervals between 1962
and 1978 for homeowners in the 0.15, 0.3, and 0.45 marginal tax brackets, and
calculations are reported for the contributions tothe extraordinary real returns
earned on a fixed-rate mortgage (relative to both no mortgage and a variable-rate
mortgage) and of differences in relative inflation rates. The next two sections
deal with the impact of increased anticipated inflation on the demand for housing
and the consumer surpluses reaped on owner-occupied housing. The impact of
increases in expected inflation on user costs of capital and consumer surpluses
is examined and measured in Section III, again for overlapping six-year periods
for homeowners in different tax brackets. Measures of the impact of inflation
both anticipated (en realized real returns) and unanticipated (on consumer
surpluses) are combined in Section IV.3
I. The Conceptual Framework
The after-tax rate of return on equity invested in owner-occupied housing
is that discount rate which equates the present value of the after-tax net
revenues from the house to the initial equity investment. The gross revenues con-
sist of an implicit flow of net rental services over time and a lump sum at the
selling date (asset price net of selling costs and the outstanding mortgage on
that date). The costs include flows of mortgage and property tax payments, after
allowance for their income tax deductibUity. If inflation generates increases
in net revenues at the quarterly rate p and housing prices at rate q and the
house, and thus the implicit rent, deteriorate at the quarterly rate d, then
the rate of return, e, would be ob1iained by solving
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is the purchase price of the house~
is the initial loan-to-value rati~(Lo/Pk)
is the implicit rent during the first quarter (j) is the marginal
physical product and Pr is the rental price)
is the inflation rate of rents (rate of change in Pr )
is the inflation rate of house price~(rate of change in lk)
is the depreciation rat~J
is the marginal income tax rate of the purchase5
is the property tax rat~
is the mortgage rate4
a is the percentage rea.ltors fee for selling the house
PAY
t is the quarterly mortgage payment
N is the holding period
e is the after-tax return on equ1t~
The left-hand side equals the equity investment. The first sum on the right is
the present va.lue of the stream of implicit rents, the second sum the present
value (negative) of property tax payments(a.llow:Lng for their tax deductibUity),
the third the present va.lue of mortgage payments, the fourth the present va.lue of
the tax saving trom the interest deductions, and the last term the present value
of the large sum remaining after the house is sold and the then outstanding
mortgage is repaid.
When the mortgage is a standard fixed-rate, fixed-payment mortgage or when
the variable-rate is expected to remain at the constant value i through period N.
and
where lot equals the origina.l term-to-maturity (in quarters) of the mortgage.
Substituting these expressions into (1.1), employing the general finite sum rule
that ~. (l+P-d
t
)t-l __ 1 - (l+P-d)N(1+8) -N d 1 in .po
L~ an so v g .Lor 0, one obtains
t=l (l+e) e-p+d
and5
When the variabJ.es on the right-hand side of equation (J..2) refer to
expected, rather than realized, val.ues, the right side is a user cost-of-capital.
expression for owner-occupied housing. This rather complicated user cost is the
hurdJ.e rate that the marginal. physical. product from additional. housing
investment must exceed in order for the investment to be undertaken. In equiJ.ibrium,
househoJ.ds will have invested in housing up to the point where equation (J..2)
hoJ.ds. The equiJ.ibrium marginal. prOduct, then, can be computed from the deprecia-
tion and expected infJ.a.tion rates' (d, p, and q), the terms of the mortgage
(QI, i, and M), the property tax rate and reaJ.tor's fees ("p and e), and the
homeowner's expected hoJ.ding period (N), income tax rate ("y), and required rate
of return (e). To compute real.ized rates of return over a given N period span
for homeowners in a given tax bracket, one simpJ.y pJ.ugs in the above-cal.culated
p for that tax bracket, z:epJ.aces p and q with ~ post val.ues, and soJ.ves for e.
The finite hoJ.ding period, in conjunction with B and the muJ.tipJ.e infJ.a.tion
and financing rates, make (J..2) a complicated expression. A series of assumptions
can transform (J..2) into reJ.a.tionships that better illustrate the primary
determinants of P and that are probabJ.y more famiJ.iar to the reader. If the
required after-tax rate of return equa.J.s the after-tax mortgage rate itseJ.f,
i.e., e = (J.-"y)i, then
p ~ + ~(J.-~ ) I) . J.-'1' )i-P+d P
o = r(J.-,. )i - p + d~ q ~ q ] + (J.-" ),. (f) ) ..k. (1. 3)
.~ y r p y p p l-~ i -q;td Pr
For taxpayers in J.ow to medium marginal tax brackets this assumption seems
pJ.a.usibJ.e because ta.xa.bJ.e bonds/mortgages are a reasonabJ.e investment alternative.
For ta.xpa.yers in higher tax-brackets, tax-exempt securities offer a superior
return., It is assumed that e equaJ.s (J.-,. )i for" < 0.3 and 0.7i for'1' > 0.3. y y - y
Note that when e = (J.-,. )i and thus equation (1.3) hoJ.ds, the equiJ.ibrium marginaJ.
y
product is independent of the size of the mortgage (QI).6
Going a step further, if the housing inflation rates are equal (p = q) y
and there are no selling costs (6 = 0), then one obtains
Pk o = (J.-T )i-q+d + (J.-T )T 1 p .
y y p r (J..4)
The right side of (J..4) is a simpJ.e user cost of capital expression that refJ.ects
the current tax treatment of housing (no taxation of implicit rents and the
deductibiJ.ity of property taxes and mortgage interest) and of interest income
(taxation at rate Ty)• WhiJ.e these simplifications aid in understanding the
factors involved, equation (J..2) wilJ. be empJ.oyed in the calcuJ.ations.
II. Realized Extraordinary ReaJ. Rates of Return
A. InfJ.ation Bates and Other Data
There are two housing prices series in.the modeJ.: the price of implicit
rents (the rent component of the consumer price index) and the price of houses
gj
(the NIA.defJ.ator for residential structures). In order to compute real rates
of return, a third series is needed. The NIA aggregate-private defJ.ator is
empJ.oyed for the general. infJ.a,tion index. The ex post (denoted by bars over the
symboJ.) inflation rates are listed in Section A of TabJ.e J. for these series by
three year intervaJ.s over the J.96J.-78 period. The general rise in inflation
since the early 1960s is obvious in all three series. The renta.l series
rose slightly less rapidly than the general price index during
~t is also assumed that q-d < e.
.?6wing to an absence of data on land prices, the present analysis considers
investment in structures only. If land prices are perfectJ.y correlated with
structures prices, then the analysis is unaffected. If inf1ation in land prices
were to exceed inflation in structures prices [see von Furstenberg (1977,
pp. 28l-88)J, then the caJ.culations presented below understate the excess rea].
returns earned on equity in homeownership.7
!I
B. Expected Intlation Rates
~ ~ ~ ~ m§. !27.2
G,ener&l (y) 1.'" 1.65 3.40 3.95 5.88 7.24
Asset Price (q) -0.13 0.96 3·99 5.12 6.80 9.63
Rents (p) 1.31 1.15 1·95 3.30 4.43 5.51
!lrrne data refer to the fourth quarter of the preceding year and are calculated
as geoDl8tric averages of ex post inflation rate during the previous 24
quarters. '
c. Unanticipated Inf'l&tion Bates
19@+=22 1967-72 1970-7:2 1273-78 1965-78
General (;'""7) 2.16 2.30 2.48 3.29 3.57
Asset Price (q-q) 4.12 4.16 2.81 4.51 6.44
Rents (p-p) 0.64 2.15 2.48 2.21 2.758
1964-69, and much less rapidly in 1973-75; the house price series increased at
a slightly lower rate in 1961-63, slightly more rapid rate in 1967-75, and by
4 percentage points per annum more during the last three years.
The expected inflation rate at any point in time is measured as a geometric
?/ a.verage of the ex post inflation rates during the previous 24 quarters. Estimates
at the beginning of various years are provided in Section B of Table J. for all
three inflation rates. Not surprisingly, aJJ. series increase almost continuously.
Unanticipated inflation during a period is defined as ;the difference between
the observed inflation rate during the period and the rate expected at the beginning
of the period. (Given the measurement of expected inflation, unanticipated inflation
'l.
during a six-year period is the expected inflation rate at the end of the interval
(the observed rate during the period) less the expected innation rate at the
beginning of the inter"'lal. To illustrate, unanticipated general inflation for the
1973-78 period (3.29 percent) is the expected inflation rate at the beginning of 1979
(7.24 percent) less the expected rate at the beginning of 1973 (3·95 percent).
Estimates of unanticipated inflation over overlapping six year periods and for
the entire 1965-78 period are presented in Section c. Unanticipated general
inflation rises slightly over time from 2 percent in 1964-69 to over 3 percent :b
1973-78; unanticipated inflation in house prices is always higher, although it
decJ.ines to under 3 percent in the 1970-75 period; and unanticipated inflation in
~ected inflation rates based upon actual rates during the previous 12 quarters
are reported in an appendix. Other candidates for expected inflation are the
Treasury bill rate J.ess a constant and the Livingston survey data on expected
inflation. These series are not employed because they are proxies for expected
innation over a very short time horizon.9
rents between 1967 and 1978 is ~ to 1-& percent less than unanticipated general
1!f
inflation. Unanticipated inflation over the longer 1965-78 period is higher than
for the subperiods owing to the low expected inflation rates at the end of 1964
(y =1.54, q =0.19 and p = 1.21).
The other data employed in the rate-of-return calculation can be described
briefly. The annual depreciation and property tax rates are assumed to be 0.02
and 0.018, respectively! and realtor's fees (8) are set at 6 percent of the value
of the house. The house purchase is assumed to be 75 percent financed With a
25-year, fixed-rate mortgage. The mortgage yield series utilized is the FHLB's
effective rate series for the 1963-72 period and the FHLB's effective rate on
75%-25 year new home comitments for the 1973-78 period ~BB Joux:naJ. , June 1978 J.
Rates of return are calculated for households in the 0.15, 0.3 and 0.45 marginal
tax brackets. As noted above, the required after..tax rates of return on housing
equity are assumed to be 0.85 times the mortgage rate for those in the 0.15 tax
bracket and 0.7 times the mrtgage rate for those in the 0.3 and 0.45 tax brackets.
B. EKcessNominal and· Real Returns
HOuseholds are assumed to invest in housing up to the point that the return
on the last dollar invested yields a marginal product such that the expected
return over the homeowner's holding period equals the required return or that
available on alternative investments. Following the procedure described in
Section I, equation (1.2) is first solved for f), Where e is the required after- .
tax rate of return and p and q are expected inflation rates, and then resolved
ljjFor an analysis explaining relative changes in housing and rental prices,
see Titman (1979).10
- for the ex post return, e, based upon the calcuJa.ted I' and ex post inflation
rates :P and q. The extraordinary nominal returns, e-e, are then computed. These
are reported in the top section of Table 2 for the same four overlapping 6-year
.periods and longer 14-year interval featured in Table 1.
Two facts are obvious. First, the extraordinary returns earned on owner-
occupied housing have been enormous over the past decade and. a half. The excess
returns have ranged from about 8percent peryear inthe "worst" 1970-75 period, when
unanticipated inflation in house prices was relatively low, to over10percent inthree
ofthefive periods. In general, housing has earned a 10 percentage point return
above that available on investments in financial assets. This is, of course, a
direct result of unanticipated inflation and the leveraged investment in the real
housing asset. Second, the excess returns are largely indePendent of the tax
bracket or income level of the investor. WhUe higher tax bracket investors
have earned greater returns in most periods, the difference in the excess returns
is small.
WhUe the data in the top section of Table 2 demonstrate that households
earned substantial excess returns on housing relative to those available on
financial assets, one might ask whether homeowners were better off in a real
sense. This is equivalent to asking whether excess ~ returns were earned on
housing, and the question can be answered by subtracting unanticipated general
inflation (the first row in Section C, Table 1) fran the excess nominal returns.
This subtraction has been performed in the lower section of Table 2. The ex post
real return on owner-occupied housing (e-y) has exceeded the expected real return
2/
(e-y) by 5 to ~ percent per annum over various subintervals of the 1964-78 period.
ilResults when the expected inflation rates are based upon ex post rates during
the previous 12 quarters are reported in an appendix. Extraordinary real
returns, under this assumption, vary between 3 and 9 percent per annum.Table 2: Extraord1nt.r:r Nominal and Real Returns Earned on Inve.tment
In Owner-occUPied Hou.ina (~)
Excess Nominal
T Returns ..z 1964-69 1967-72 1970-75 1973-78 1965-78
(1) 0.15 9·76 10.45 7.85 10.27 8.44
(2) 0.30 10·32 10·75 7.83 10.6>1 9·16
(3) 0.45 10.60 10.79 7·70 10·73 9·48
Excess Reay
Re1i}11"nI
(4) 0.15 7.60 8.15 5·37 6·98 4.87
(5) 0.30 8.16 8.45 5·35 7.32- 5·59
(6) 0.45 8.44 8.49 5.22 7.44 5·91
!I»Xcess nominal returns less unanticipated general inf'l&t1on (Y-y).
1112
It should be emphasized that these are spendable real gains. Young, growing
families have often used the gains to purchase additional housing. Older shrinking
families often realize some gains when moving to a smaller unit, and, with the
new reverse mortgages, can borrow automatically against the gains. Often
households implicitly realize the gains by borrowing (second-mortgages or
consumer credit) or by reducing their savings out of current income.
C. Sources of Differences in ElC Post and EKpected Real Returns
There are two primary sources of differences between ex post and ex ante
real returns: differences in relative unanticipated inflation rates and the
existence of mortgage debt. To see the importance of the former, consider equation
(1.4) When ('J := o. Replacing (l-T )i with e, solving for e, and subtracting y
the expected general inflation rate y from both sides, the expected real rate of
return on housing equity is
P 0
e-y =~ -d - (l-T)T + q - y. Pk Y P
The ex post equivalent is
(2.1)
P 0 e-y = ~. - d - (l-T)T + q - y, (2.2)
k y P
where bars over variables denote ex post values. Subtracting (2.1) from (2.2)
and solving
e-y - (e-y) = q-q - (y-y). (2.2)'
Thus, with ~ =0, p = q and 8 =0, ex post and ex ante real returns on housing
equity would vary one-for-one with differences in unanticipated inflation rates.
To illustrate the importance of mortgage debt, consider the one-period
version of (1.2) when B = 0 and p =q:13
P 0
.L-= (l-oo)e + (1-1" )O'i - q + d + (l-T )T ,
Pk Y Y P
which can be rewritten as
P 0
(1-00) (e-q) = .; - d - (1-T)T - a[(l-T )i - q'.
k Y P Y -
The ex post equiva1ent, assuming a fixed-rate mortgage, 1s
SUbtracting (2.3) from (2.4) and so1ving
e..q - (e-q) • l~q-q). -a
With no difference in unanticipated inflation rates (q-q :: y-y), the
(2.4)
(2.4)'
ex post real return on equity will devi8lte from the expected real return by a
mw..tiple ta/(l-a)1of unanticipated infl&tion.
The existence of a mortgage will not necessarily result in extraordinary
gains when unanticipated inflation rates are positive (and eql&l). Assume that
the mortgage has a variable rate 1. With q-q =y-y, subti'act1on ot (2.3)
from (2.4), after replacing 1 in (2.4) with t, yields
With i ... i + <y-y)/(l-1"y)' extraordinary real returns would neceaaar11y be
zero. That is, if the index rate of the var1&ble-nte mortgage moved with
a multiple (1/(l-Ty)1of unanticipated inflation, 8uch that the rea.l1zed real .
after-tax variable rate equalled the initial rate, then the mortsase would14
not provide extraordinary returns during periods of unanticipated inflation.
Of course, no known index rate rises this rapidly because (1) interest rates
move with expected inflation which tends to adjust gradually to unanticipated
inflation and (2) the movement tends to be only one-for-one, rather than a
§j
multiple.
The contributions of the mortgage and relative unanticipated inflation rates
to the excess ex post returns earned on housing over selected six-year periods
are listed in Table 3. The first row simply reproduces row (5) of Table 2, except
that data for the 1962-67 interval have been added in order to include a period
where excess housing gains were relatively minor. As is indicated in row (2),
most of the excess return is due to the existence of a mortgage during a period
of unanticipated inflation. The contribution of the IJX)rtgage moves directly with
unanticipated housing inflation, which rose in the late 1960s declined in the
early 1970s, and rose again in the middle 1970s (see Table 1). Because unantici:
pated housing inflation exceeded unanticipated general inflation in every period
[see row (4)1, relative unanticipated inflation alwa,ys made a positive contribu-
tion to the excess real ex post return on housing. However, the contribution
never exceeded It- percentage points. Comparison of rows (2) and (4) suggest that
a percentage point excess of unanticipated housing inflation over general
inflation raises the ex post real return by about halfof a percentage point.
It is sometimes argued that the existence of variable-rate mortgage (VRMs)
would be "unfair" to existing homeowners during periods of unanticipated
§/Feldstein (1976, p. 816, note 15) argues that the failure of interest rates to
move with a multiple of expected inflation is due to the taxation of nominal
capital gains and the use of historic-cost depreciation. Hendershott (1979)
provides analysis to support this conjecture. For an analysis emphasizing
non-tax factors that might account for interest rates not rising with a multiple
of expected inflation, see Levi and Markin (1978).Table 3: Sources of Extraordinary Real Returns for Dif'ferent Six Year Bo1ding Periods. or = 0.3(%) y
62-67 64-69 ~ 12:.72. :u:::w.
Excess Ex Post Real Returns 2.23 8.16 8.45 5·35 7·32
(11 OWing to Mortgage 1.88 7.24 7.36 5·20 6·52 (2 Owing to Relative Inflation 0·35 0·92 1.09 0.15 0.80
MeIOOrandlDJl
(3) Reduction in Ex Post Real
0.08 0.84 1.24 -0.16 1.28 Rate if' VRM Existed!/
(4) Excess of Unanticipated }busing
0.59 1.96 1.86 0.33 1.38 Inflation over General Inflation EI




inflation because mortgage interest payments would rise unexpectedly. The
16
existence of VRMs during such periods would obviously reduce ex post returns on
the equity of existing homeowners. However, if the unexpected added interest
expense is accompanied by greater unexpected real capital gains, then homeowners
would still be better off in the sense that their realized real return on the
housing investment would exceed their expected real return. To address this issue,
realized real rates of return were calculated on the assumption that VRMs with an
index rate equal to that on newly-issued fixed-rate mortgages existed. The
difference between ex post returns with fixed-rate mortgages and with VRMs are
listed in row (3). As can be seen, the reduction in return owing to a VRM is
only a fraction of the total excess ex post return attributable to the mortgage.
In no six-year period Would a VRM have offset as much as one-quarter of the
excess real return earned. Even with VRMs, homeowners would have earned substantial
excess real returns during these periods of unanticipated inflation.
III. Expected Inflation. the User Cost of Capital. and the Demand for Owner-
OccyPied Housing
Housing economists appear to have turned 180 degrees in the past few years
in their views regarding the impact of inflation on housing demand. In the
early 1970s the impact of inflation on monthly payments (and downpayments to a
lesser degree) was the focus ofattention. Owing to thewidespreaduseofthe fixed-payment
7.1A related argument against VRMs is that households cannot manage the higher
cash flow outlays. For a critique of this argument, see Hendershott and Villani
(1978, pp. 17-24 and 88-90). To the extent that higher outlays do constrain
household expenditures during periods in Which inflation and interest rates
are rising, VRMs ~l.ay a useful macroeconomic stabilization role Lvon Furstenberg
(1977, pp. 293-95)).17
mortgage, inflation "tilted" real monthly payments upward during the early years
of the mortgage, resulting in a sharp increase in the ratio of the initial monthly
p~nt to current income. As a consequence, housing was "unaffordable" to
those who would have been able to purchase houses or more housing in the absence
§/
of the tilt. The graduated-payment mortgage was advocated as a means orfreversing
this tilt, and the Emergency Home :Purchase Assistance Act of 1974 was passed in
which mortgage credit was to be made available at below-market interest rates
when inflationary conditions were having a severely disproportionate negative
effect on the housing industry.
In recent years attention has shifted to the impact of inflation on the
~
underlying equilibrium demand for housing. The unaffordability argument pertains
to a perceived disequilibrium where inflation-induced financial constraints hold
effective housing demand below the equilibrium level. The underlying equilibrium
demand for housingis stimulatedbyinflationbecause the realafter-taxreturn from non-
housing investments and thecost ofhome mortgagecreditdecline. Recent (1976-78) levelsof
single family housingsales andproduction and increases inhousingprices suggest that the
positive impactofinflationon the underlying equilibriumdemand for housing hasoutweighed/
the negative impact created by financial constraints. This would not be surprising
because the financial constraints probably bind only on potential first-time home
buyers who have not already reaped extraordinary housing capital gains that would
allow large downpayments and thus relatively small monthly payments. In contrast,
§/see Hendershott and Villani (1978, pp. 17-24) for a brief discussion of this
argument. The most thorough treatment in this area is Modigliani and Lessard
(1975).
21see Villani (1978) and (1979), Diamond (1979) and Titman (1979).18
the stimulation to equilibrium demand applies to both existing homeowners and
potential first-time buyers. In this section the impact of increases in anticipated
inflation on the user cost of capital and thus the equilibrium demand for housing
is analyzed.
A. Graphical Illustration
In equilibrium all households will have purchased owner-occupied housing
up to the point that the percentage implicit rental income earned on the last
dollar of housing equals the user cost of capital as defined by the right-hand
side of equation (1.2). A decline in the user cost of capital would lead households
to demand additional or higher quality bedrooms, bathrooms, and family rooms until the
utility or implicit rent.s from these decline to the lower cost of capital. The
relation between the implicit rents earned by a representative household in the
15 percent tax bracket and the stock of housing occupied is denoted by the schedule
labelled I' in the left panel of Figure 1. Given the current inflation rate <10'
the cost of capital is Co and the quantity of housing demanded is K O. The p
schedule and Co and K O values in the right panel are those relevant tp a
representative homeowner in the 30 percent tax bracket. The figure is dra.wn so
that the cost of capital is lower for the homeowner in the higher tax bracket.
This is true because the net (after-tax) property tax, mortgage interest rate,
and opportunity cost of funds are all lower for a homeowner in a higher tax
M2I
bracket. The importance of the tax bracket to the cost of capital is illustrated
most clearly by the simple cost of capital expression on the right side of
equation (1.4).
!QjFor discussions of the distribution of the tax subsidy by income class, see
Aaron (1972), Laidler (1969), and White and White (1977).FIGURE 1: THE IMPACT OF AN INCREASE IN IID'LATION ON HOUSIIii DEMAND AND CONSUMER SURPLUS
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To determine the approximate impact of an increase in expected inflation on
the cost of capital, we take the derivative of (1.4) with respect to q:
~ = (1-'1' ) ~i - 1.
dq y ~
Thus the cost of capital will decline if oi/~ < 'J/(l-'I'y)' This inequality has
held in recent years for·two reasons. First, the interest rate has increased
only about one-for-one with increases in the anticipated general inflation rate.
Second, the anticipated inflation rate of housing prices has increased by more
than has the anticipated general inflation rate (see Table 2). The impact of
an increase in the expected inflation rate and the resultant decline in the user
cost on the quantity of housing demanded by the two representative households is
indicated by the increases from K O to IS. in Figure 1. The increases in the consumer .'
surpluses earned on housing are indicated by the hatched areas labelled GAIN.
B. User Costs of Capital and the Efficient Allocation of Resources
User costs of capital for 24 and 56 quarter holding periods are reported
in Table 4 for homebuyers in the 0.15, 0.3 and 0.45 marginal tax brackets at
three different points in time. The first, 1964-4, is shortly prior to the
acceleration in inflation; the third, 1978-3, is the most recent quarter with
available data and is the quarter of peak expected inflation (to date); during
the interim quarter, 1972-4, expected inflation equalled about an a.verage or
the 1964-4 and 1978-3 values. The two noteworthy characteristics of the data
are expected. First, the user costs or investment hurdle rates are lower the
higher the tax bracket. Second, the hurdle rates have generally declined over
time as expected inflation has risen, and the decline is especially sharp -- 4~
percentage points -- for investors in the 0.45 tax bracket. Moreover, this
user cost of capital for these investors is slightly overstated.Ta.ble 4: User Costs of Ca.pital (%)
1964-4 1972-4 1978-3
IT = 24 N = 56 N = 24 N = 56 N = 24 N = 56
l' = 0.15 13·33 12·38 12.51 12·58 12.71 14·38
l' = 0.3 11.44 10.54 9·88 9·80 8.59 9·61
l' = 0.45 9·76 8·93 7.67 7·61 5.38 6.30 --
~24
corporate investment in structures LHendershott and Hu (1980)1. The productivity
gains fromreducing the tax subsidyto owner-occupiedhousing are thus likelyto be
gJ .
substantial.
IV. The Combined Benefits from Anticipated and Unanticipated Infiation
Estimates of the extraordinary realized real returns earned on investment
in owner-occupied housing owing to unanticipated inflation were reported in
.Table 2. Our final task is to compute comparable estimates of the gains in
consumer surplus generated by increases in anticipated inflation. A rough
measure of the gain in consumer surpluses (the hatched GAIN in Figure 1) can be
obtained by assuming that the implicit-rents curve exhibits unitary elasticity




where a(Y) is the shift factor and is assumed to be increasing with respect to





The gain from the increase in inflation can be obtained by integrating equation
(4.1) from Co to cl' which yields
GAIN(Y) = a(Y)(log Co - log cl )·
To make the consumer surplus gain in a given period comparable to the real gain
on equity owing to unanticipated inflation, the gain is divided by the equity in
!lI
the newly purchased house, (l-a)~:
WRosen (1979) estimates a productivity gain from eliminating the housing tax
subsidy of $107 per family based upon his 1970 sample. Given that there were
40 million owner-occupied units in 1970, the total productivity gain would be
roughly W billion ($107 times 40 million).
!3/The gain in consumer surplus is, of course, independent of the form of the
financing of the housing purchase (the value of a).25
This percentage gain can thus be obtained directly from measures of c at various
points in time.
The following senario Wlderlles the caJ.culations in Tab~e 5. Househo~ds
purchased homes in ~964-4 that provided them with the optimal. quantity of housing.
The dec~ine in the user cost of capita.~, which was partic~~y drama.tic after
~970, caused the househo~ds to purchase ~ger houses in ~972-4. These houses
were he~d unti~ ~978-3 when the further fall in cost of capitu, which was
especially rapid after ~975, induced the purchase of even arger houses. The
extraordinary rea~ gains from. inflation, both anticipated and unant::lc ipated, from
~964-4 to ~972-4 are ~1mited to the rea~ gain on equity investment upon the assumed
sa~e in 1972-4. Between ~972-4 and ~978-3 further gains on equity investment
were a~o realized, and these were supplemented by enlarged consumer surpluses
owing to the lower cost of capitu in ~972-4. All of these gains accrue to first-
home bUYers in ~972-4, as well as househo~ds ro~ling into larger houses at that
time. Unexpected real gains (or losses) after 1978-3 on the equity invested in
the 1978-3 purchase are at this point unknown, but substa.nti~lylarger consumer
surpluses vis-a-vis those which would have been earned on a house purchased at
the cost of capital existing in 1964-4 are known.
The annual real excess returns owing to inflation are 8 to at percent
in the 1965-72 period owing solel;y' to unanticipated inflation (Table 5).
Between ~973 and ~978 the excess real returns were ~O to ~5 percent, consisting
of 7 to 7~ percent from W1&nticipated infation a.r.d 3 to 7~ percent from anticipated
in~tion. The atter excess returns increase with the income of the househo~d.
For the post-~978 period, the reu excess returns range from 2t to ~3 percent and
increase sha.rp~y with the income ~ev~. These are, of course, independent of anyTable 5: Combined Annual ReaJ. Gains on Owner-occupied Housing from Anticipated
and Unanticipated Inflation (as a Percentage of Equity Invested at the
Beginning of the Indicated Period) .
1965-72 1973-78 !212-1
Real Return on Equity Investment!! 7.87 6·98 1
T = 0.15 I Added Consumer SurplUS'21 ---- ~ 2.43 -
TOTAL 7.87 10.16 2.43+1
Real Return on Equity Investment!! 8·30 7·32 1
T =0.3 I Added Consumer SurplUS21 ---- ~ 2.:!J1..
TOTAL 8·30 13.14 9·87+1
Real Return on E .•uity Investment!! 8.46 7.44 ?
T = 0.45 I Added Consumer Surp1us'21 ---- ...1:2!Q 12.82
TOTAL 8.46 14.84 12.82+7
~Table 2 for N = 24, 1965-72 data are averages of data for 1964-69 and 1967-72.
EfTab1e 5 for N = 24.
I\)
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future unanticipated inflation. Relative to their counterparts ill late 1964,
current homeowners are in an enviable position. Even if future inflation should
equal anticipated inflation, todays homeowners ill tax brackets of about 25
percent or higher will fare better because of their enormous consumer surpluses
than the homeowners of 1964 did as a result of unanticipated inflation.
A final consideration is why, when both existing and new homeowners gailled
so enormously from the inflation of the past decade and a half, there is such a
concern over the "rising cost of homeownership"? A plausible answer is the
above-mentioned increase in fillancial constraints that hold effective housing
demand below the eqUilibrium level. The movement to lower percentage down-
payments and the use of graduated-payment mortgages has, of course, mitigated
the impact of these constraillts. Regrettably, however, much of the concern
about the cost of homeownership seems to be based upon a misrepresentation of
the financial costs of housing. Rather than measuring these costs ill real
14' after-tax terms, nominal before-tax costs have been employed.:::! For example,
the mortgage-interest component of the consumer price index, which is calculated
as the product of a before-tax nominal mortgage rate and a house price series,
rose by 39 percent between the end of 1974 and the end of 1978. In contrast,
a component based upon a real after-tax illterest rate would have about halved,
owing to a decline in the real after-tax ('I'y = 0.25) mortgage rate from 2
percent to about i percent.!2I
~Downs (1978), in an otherwise enlightened analysis, promulgates this error.
Diamond (1979) shows the true decline in the cost of home ownership.
!'2JThe implications of this difference for movements in the CPI are being
investigated by Robert Van Order and others at HUD.28
v. Summry
Unanticipated inflation results in capital gains that accrue entirely to the
homeowner (unless a variable-rate mortgage exists). Thus a homeowner with a
l.everaged investment earns real, as well as nominal, gains, and these are
especially l.arge if housing prices rise more rapidly than prices generally. For
houses hel.d for various six-year intervals between 1964 and 1978 real annuaJ.
rates of return exceeded expected real returns by 5 to ~ percentage points. The
existence of variabl.e-rate mortgages (VRMs) with an index rate eQ.uaJ. to the
current mortgage rate would have lowered these excess real returns only slightly
to the 5 to 7 percentage point range. Even with VRMs, unanticipated inflation
benefits homeowners substantially.
Anticipated inflation lowers the user cost of capital. for owner-occupied
housing, the reduction being greater the higher the tax bracket of the investor,
and raises the demand for housing. At latel978 expected inflation rates,the
user cost of capital, and thus the equilibrium marginal physical product of
owner-occupied housing, for those in high tax brackets is only 5 percent. Given
that the equilibrium marginal physical product of corporate investment in
structures is about l5 percent, the favored tax treatment of owner-occupied
housing is the source of significant productivity losses for the economy.
Substitution of a l5 percent tax credit for the mortgage interest and property
tax deductions (and cessation of the double taxation of corporate income) would
lead to a considerably more efficient allocation of the American capital stock.
The fall in the cost of capital generated by increased anticipated inflation
increases the consumer surpluses of homebuyers. Again, the increase is greater
the higher is the homeowner's tax bracket. The gains in consumer surpluses between
1964 and 1978 for homeowners in tax brackets of 25 percent or higher, expressed as a
portion of the equity invested in a 1978 house (assuming a 1oan-to-value ratio of
0.75), were even greater than the extraordinary real returns real.ized on housing29
equity during the 1964-78 period. Not taking the declines in user cost into
account in the calculation of the mortgage interest component of the consumer
price index has resulted in an overstatement of inflation during the last four
years.
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This appendix provides alternative versions of Tables 1-5, in which expected
inflation rates are based upon observed rates during the previous 3, rather than
6, years. As a result, this estimate of expected inflation rises more rapidly than
that underlying the Tables in the text. Because unanticipated inflation in this
calculation is less than thatin the text, the extraordinary realized real gains
on equity investment in housing are less. On the other hand, the user cost of
capital declines more rapi~ so the consumer surplus gains are greater.
Table A1: Inf'la.tion Rates (% per annum)
A. Expected Inflation Rates!:!
~ ~ ~ m.l ~ !212.
General (y) 0.88 2.42 4·39 3·52 8.30 6.19
Asset Price (q) -0·39 2·33 5.68 4.57 9·09 10.16
Rents (p) 1.08 1.22 2.68 3·93 4·94 6.08
PiThe data refer to the fourth quarter of the preceding year and are calculated
as geometric averages of ex post inflation rate during the previous 12 quarters.
B. Unanticipated Inflation Rates (see!I above)
1264-69 1967-72 1970-75 1973-78 1965-78
General (y-y) 2·52 1·53 1.49 3-72 3·47
Asset Price (q-q) 4.38 3·88 1.12 5.06 6.25
Rents (p-p) 0.87 2.08 1·75 1.58 2·9032
Excess Real
Returns'£!
(4) 0.15 7.20 5.04 3.16 7.07 5.13
(5) 0·30 8.80 5.06 3·10 7·57 5·77
(6) 0.45 9·12 4·94 2·98 7.81 6.05
!/BaSed upon rapic:Uy rising expected inflation rates (see Table Al, note !/).
EIExcess nominaJ. returns less unanticipated general inflation (Y-y).Table A3: Sources of Extraordinary Real Returns, T = 0.3(%)
"""Y'
62-67 64-69 67-72 7.0-75 73-78
Excess Ex Post ReaJ. Returns 2.40 8.80 5·06 3·10 7·57
(1) Owing to Mortgage 2·32 7.gB 4.48 3.04 6·96
(2) Owing to Relative Inflation 0.08 0.82 0·58 0.06 0.61
Memrandum
(3) Reduction in Ex Post Real 0.04 0.80 1.26 -0.12 1·32 Rate if VRM Existed!I
(4) Excess of Unanticipated Housing 0.62 1.86 2.35 -0·37 1·34 Inflation over General Inf'lation "'9J
gjAssumes index rate is new issue home mrtgage rate.
"'9Jq-q _ (y_y)
Table A4: User Costs of Capital (%): Rapidly Rising Expected Inflation Rates
1964-4 1972-4 1978-3
N=24 N=56 N =24 N=56 N=24 N =56
T =0.15 13.27 12.45 12.74 12·34 12.19 13·01
T =0.3 11.37 10.61 10.19 9·74 8.10 8·35
T =0.45 9·67 8·95 8.04 7.68 4·94 5.14
w
wTable A5: Combined Annual Real Gains on Owner-occupied Housing from
Anticipated and Unanticipated Inflation (as a Percentage of
Equity Invested at the Beginning of the Indicated Period).
1965-72 1973-78 ~-?
Real Return on Equity Investment!:! 6.12 7·07 ? .
or =0.15 I Added Consumer Surp1US!U ---- 2.08 4.15
TOTAL 6.12 9·15 4.15+1
Real Return on Equity Investment!:! 6.93 7·57 ?
'r =o. 3 I Added Consumer Surp1USPi ---- 4.48 Jfh.21 -
TOTAL 6·93 12.05 10·97+1
Real. Return on Equity Investment!! 7·03 7.81 1
or = 0.45 I Added Consumer Surp1USPi ---- 5·96 ~.28 -
TOTAL 7·03 13.77 13·28+1
!ITable A2 for N = 24, 1965-72 data. are averages of data. for 1964-69 and 1967-72..
PiTable A5 for N =24.
w
+:-